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On the Irreplaceability of Animal Life 
As animal rights becomes a fash­
ionable topic of debate within the aca­
demic community, we see a spate of 
arguments emerging which deny or 
conflict with the fundamental moral 
principles of equal consideration of 
interests. 1 Whatever the motivation 
for such arguments, the practical 
result is the putative justification of 
the continued use, abuse, and 
slaughter of non-human animals for 
man's own purposes--purposes which 
are by no means consistent with the 
telos of the animals themselves. 
One example is the so-called 
"replacement argument," the very 
name of which calls attention to the 
traditional view of animals as mere 
things, interchangeable from the point 
of view of human utility. The 
replacement a rgument derives from 
classical utilitarianism,2 but has been 
recently revived with various modifi­
cations. 3 Such an argument could 
only have emerged within the context 
of a world view which takes it for 
granted that animals exist primarily 
for the benefit of human beings. The 
argument may be outlined as follows: 
Provided that: 
1.	 an animal's life is on the 
whole "worth living," i.e., 
involves more pleasu re than 
pain, 
2.	 	 the would not haveanimal 
existed at all had it not 
been del iberately brought 
into existence by man, and 
3.	 The animal will be replaced 
after its death by another 
an imal for whom conditions 
#1 and #2 hold true, 
Then: 
the person or persons who 
brought that animal into exis­
tence may use and kill it as 
they see fit. 
Now the fundamental principle of 
utilitarianism, in all its varieties, is 
that pleasure is a good and pain an 
evil. In the argument above, condi­
tions #1 and #2 are intended to guar­
antee that the animal is "compensated" 
for any pain inflicted upon it. Con­
dition #3 is intended to guarantee that 
"the world" is "compensated" for any 
pain inflicted upon it as a result of 
the killing of the animal. 
But is such a compensation in fact 
possible? Can the unnecessary inflic­
tion of pain and death on non-human 
animals be morally justified? My aim 
here is to demonstrate that rigorous 
(but undogmatic) adherence to the 
principle that pain is an intrinsic evil 
entails the rejection of the replacement 
argument. 
I shall also try to show that, while 
developed within the framework of 
utilitarian thinking, this argument is 
inconsistent with utilitarianism, as well 
as our ordinary moral intuitions. 
Finally, I shall consider how the 
argument would have to be modified in 
order to square with classical utilita­
rianism, the premise that pain is an 
intrinsic evil, and our ordinary moral 
intuitions. If the assumption that 
pain is an intrinsic evil is correct and 
my reasoning is sound, then we are 
morally obliged to desist from the 
overwhelming majority of practices and 
uses of animals to which we are pres­
ently accustomed. 
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What does it mea n for someth i ng to 
be an intrinsic evil? If something is 
evil in itself, that means that it is not 
evil relative to something else. Con­
sequently, it can't be justified by any 
good which may result from it, nor be 
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weighed against resultant good in 
determining how we shold act. 
If, then, pain is an intrinsic evil, 
under what conditions, if any, is it 
morally justified to inflict it? Let us 
consider several possible cases. In 
each case we shall ask whether the 
infliction of pain is justified in terms 
of our premise that pain is an intrin­
sic evil, in terms of classical utilita­
rianism, and in terms of our ordinary 
moral intuitions. Examination of these 
various cases will enable us to judge 
whether or not the replacement argu­
ment is valid. 
1. No pleasure bestowed or 
resulting; no resultant relief of pain 
Where pain is inflicted which results 
neither in pleasure nor the relief of 
pain, and the being is not "compen­
sated" by the subsequent bestowal of 
pleasure, it is analytically obvious 
that such conduct is morally wrong, if 
pain is an intrinsic evil. It is also 
wrong according to utlitarianism, since 
to so act is in no way to promote the 
balance of pleasure over pain. 
Finally, it is in obvious violation of 
our ordinary moral intuitions. 
2. Greater pleasure bestowed In 
this case, the animal is "compensated" 
to some degree for the infliction of 
pain by the subsequent bestowal of 
greater pleasure. The pain, however, 
is in no way necessary to the enjoy­
. ment of the pleasure. If pain is 
intrinsically evil, it obviously cannot 
be cancelled out by the unrelated 
bestowal of pleasure. Utilitarianism 
wou Id also reject this case as immoral, 
since in inflicting the pain one is not 
acting in such a way as to maximize 
pleasure. Our moral intuitions 
conti ,':11 these concl usions. Most of us 
would be '!owilling to operate· on the 
principle thai: it is morally right to 
wrong provided one does more right 
than wron:J. . 
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3. Resultant greater pleasure This 
case is based on a strong version of 
the principle that the end justifies the 
means. Here the infliction of pain 
results in greater pleasure: for the 
"world,"· other individuals, or the 
being himself. If pain is an intrinsic 
evil, however, it is not commensurable 
with pleasure, i.e., cannot be can­
celled out by, or weighed against 
resultant pleaure in determining the 
moral .value of a particular act. 
Where the totality of pleasure in the 
world is increased as a result of the 
infliction of pain, it is theoretically 
possible that the individual level. of 
happiness of all the beings concerned 
might be reduced. For example, by 
reducing the level of individual com­
fort in an ameliorated factory farm, 
the farmer may be able to house more 
chickens under conditions which pre­
serve a slight balance of pleasure 
over pain for individual chickens, 
while at the same time creating a total 
level of happiness which is greater 
than before. . 
Consequently, not all versions of 
utilitarianism would accept such con­
duct as morally justified. It would be 
inconsistent, for example, wth Bent­
ham's principle of "the greatest hap­
pi ness of the greatest number." Ou r 
moral intuitions confirm that it is not 
justified to inflict pain on someone 
else to increase the world's total level 
of happiness or pleasure. 
Where it is other individuals, 
rather than "the world," who experi­
ence an increase in pleasure as a 
result of the infliction of pain, classi­
cal utilitarianism would, in principle, 
accept such conduct as morally justi­
fied since it promotes a balance of 
pleasu re over pain. As in the previ­
ous . case, our ordinary moral intui­
tions, and the premise that pain is an 
intrinsic evil tell us that it is morally 
wrong to inflict pain on one being to 
promote pleasure in another. 
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Even where the infliction of pain 
results in greater pleasure for the 
being himself, the premise that pain is 
an intrinsic evil would prohibit such 
conduct as morally unjustified. An 
individual may indeed choose to suffer 
lesser pain for the sake of enjoying 
greater pleasure, but if pain is 
intrinsically evil, then no one else has 
the right to presume that he would 
make this choice, or to inflict pain on 
a being "for his own good." Utilita­
rianism, of course, would regard such 
conduct as morally justified since pain 
and pleasure can be weighed against 
each other. Our ordinary moral intu­
itions appear ambiguous in this case. 
If no problematic examples are cited, 
most of us would probably regard the 
principle expressed here as justified. 
Cou nter-examples, however, easily 
come to mind. We may admit that the 
pleasure which eventually results from 
a child prodigy's being coerced by his 
parents into long, grueling hours of 
practice at the piano is greater than 
the pain the child suffered as a result 
of being deprived of the normal joys 
of childhood, without being willing to 
acknowledge that the parents' actions 
were morally justified. The price of 
suffering the pain may be "too great" 
even where the pleasure that results 
is greater. 
'I. Prevention or relief of greater 
suffering in others Th is case is by 
far the most difficult and problematic, 
and the one upon which the issue of 
animal abuse principally turns. The 
legitimacy of deliberately inflicting 
lesser pain to relieve greater pain in 
others is based on a weak version of 
the principle that the end justifies the 
means. If pain is an intrinsic evil, 
then it wou Id seem obvious that we 
should attempt to eliminate as much of 
it as possible. It might· therefore 
seem that if we can eliminate greater 
pain by inflicting lesser pain, we 
should do it. On the other hand, if 
pain is intrinsically evil, then it would 
also seem that we should never inflict 
it, that even relief of greater pain 
could not justify deliberate infliction 
of an intrinsic evil. The principle 
that pain is an intrinsic evil thus does 
not seem, in and of itself, to provide 
any clear· solution. to the question. 
There are, however, several relevant 
considerations which will help lead us 
to a sol ution . 
Fi rst of all, is the infliction of the 
lesser pain the only means of relieving 
the greater pain? If not, it seems 
quite clear, in terms of both utilita­
rianism and the principle that pain is 
an intrinsic evil, that such conduct 
would be morally wrong. 
Secondly, is the failure to prevent 
or alleviate pain as morally wrong as 
the deliberate infliction of it? If not, 
then the greater seriousness of delib­
erately inflicting pain might counter­
balance the weight of the greater pain 
which is not relieved, so that inflic­
tion of the lesser pain would be mor­
ally unjustified. 
Thirdly, IS the being upon whom 
the lesser pain is inflicted in any way 
responsible for the greater pain which 
is being relieved or prevented? 
Self-defense would be a typical 
instance of this case. It seems 
clearly justified, for example, to 
inflict lesser pain on an animal, by 
whom one is being attacked, in order 
to prevent suffering greater harm, 
assuming, as already mentioned, that 
there is 
method 
harm. 
no reasonably safe alternative 
of preventing the greater· 
The same reasoning would apply 
(with perhaps somewhat less force) to 
the case of inflicting lesser pain on a 
being to prevent greater harm to 
someone else whom that being is 
th reaten ing. 
It would appear, therefore, that we 
can at least delimit three subcases 
where the legitimacy of inflicting 
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lesser suffering to relieve greater 
suffering is determinable. It is never 
morally justified to inflict pain to 
relieve it if the latter pain could have 
been relieved in some other way. It 
is always· morally justified to inflict 
lesser pain on a being in self-defense 
in order to prevent· greater pain from 
being inflicted on oneself, where there 
is no other way of preventing it. 
Finally, it will in most cases be justi­
fied to inflict lesser pain on one being 
to prevent him .from inflicting greater 
pain on someone else, again provided 
that this is the only means of pre­
venting it. 
Where it. is a question of deliber­
ately inflicting pain on a being who is 
innocent, i.e., in no way responsible 
for the greater pain one is attempting 
to prevent or alleviate, things are, of 
course, much more difficult, and here 
our moral intuitions appear to be 
ambiguous. The smaller the pain 
inflicted is in relation to the pain 
relieved, the more we will be inclined 
to regard it as justified. The greater 
it is, the less likely that we will 
regard it as justified. It may be that 
we would want to draw the line at 
some point, maintaining that if the 
ratio between the pain inflicted and 
. the pain relieved is great enough, 
then the principle is morally valid, 
but otherwise not. Such a position 
would, of course, entail enormous, 
perhaps insuperable pragmatic diffi­
culties in properly calculating the pain 
ratio in given concrete moral situ­
ations, but is a coherent position in 
theory. Whatever we decide, how­
ever, the principle must be applied 
consistently if we are. not to be guilty 
of moral hypocrisy. 
Most of us are perfectly willing to 
accept this principle without qualifica­
tion as a maxim for action in the 
world so long as· it is a non-human 
who suffers the pain and a human 
whose pain is relieved. Few of us 
would be willing to apply it without 
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qualification to human beings. Fewer 
still would acknowledge that it is mor­
ally justifiable to conduct painful 
experiments on a human being to find 
a cure for parvo in dogs. Yet why 
not? Is there a relevant difference 
between human and non-human animals 
which would justify this preferential 
treatment? It seems quite clear, at 
least in the case of the vast majority 
of non-human animals, that there is 
not. There seems to be no morally 
valid ground for not consistently 
applying the principle that relief of 
greater suffering justifies infliction of 
pain, and indeed, to demand, for the 
sake of such consistency, that humans 
be made to suffer equally for the 
benefit of dogs and other non-human 
animals. 
If, on the other hand, for some 
reason we are unwilling to subject 
humans to such suffering, then we 
must also refrain, if we do not wish 
to be guilty of moral hypocrisy, from 
inflicing it on non-human animals. 
It wou Id therefore seem that 
although this principle is clearly con­
sistent with utilitarianism, and not 
clearly inconsistent with the principle 
that pain is an intrinsic evil, it 
involves consequences which the vast 
majority of us would be unwilling to 
accept. 4 
If this is so, then the only inflic­
tion of pain on animals or anyone ele 
which we may accept as morally justi­
fiable is for defense or for the benefit 
of the being himself. This conclusion 
effectively eliminates as immoral the 
overwhelming majority of ou r uses of 
animals. 
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Having examined, from the stand­
point of these three viewpoints, the 
various possible cases of inflicting 
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pain, let us now look at the necessary 
conditions cited in the replacement 
argument for the moral justifiability of 
inflicting pain on non-human animals. 
There are two kinds of benefits 
which proponents of this argument 
believe compensate the animal. The 
first is the benefit of being able to 
live out at least a portion of his natu­
ral life in a condition in which there 
is a preponderance of pleasure over 
pain (premise #1). The second is the 
"benefit of existence" (premise #2). 
A little reflection upon these supposed 
"benefits" reveals that in most cases 
they are no benefits at all. Permit­
ting an animal to lead a semblance of 
his natu ral life, rather than totally 
thwarting his physical, psychological, 
and behavioral needs--which is what 
is usually meant by allowing the ani­
mal to have a life "worth living"--is in 
no way to bestow a benefit upon him, 
but merely to refrain from a greater 
evil. What unabashed pretension on 
the pa rt of the· "concerned" fa rmer 
and the "humane" experimenter (not 
to mention the college professor who 
supports them) to claim that they are 
doing the animal a favor by allowing 
him to live in somewhat the manner he 
would live anyway, under natural 
conditions, apart from their interfer­
ence and exploitation. As Dale Jamie­
son has pointed out, animals don't 
need to be protected by ma n ; th ey 
simply need to be left alone. To allow 
animals to be what they are is not 
magnanimity on man's part; it is sim­
ple justice. To do so is merely to 
give animals their due. Were it not 
for the fact that we live in a world in 
which gross institutionalized abuse of 
animals is the rule, rather than the 
exception, such action would not even 
merit commendation. 
While the replacement argument as 
given would, of course, allow a per­
son to treat animals in a way which is 
morally justified according to the 
premise that pain is intrinsically evil, 
it in no way requires him to do so, 
and indeed permits conduct of the 
worst sort (i. e, . case #1) as analyzed 
above. For example: it is perfectly 
compatible with the replacement agu­
ment to wantonly and sadistically 
engage in the periodic beating of a 
dog which one has deliberately bred, 
provided that such treatment does not 
occur so often as to make the dog's 
life on the whole more painful than 
pleasurable. The replacement argu­
ment does not require that any good 
whatever result from the infliction of 
pain, whether for the animal or any­
one else. It does not even require 
that one "compensate" the animal for 
the useless pain inflicted upon it 
(case #2). It is sufficient that the 
animal's life is on balance "worth liv­
ing," even though one may have 
reduced that animal's· level of happi­
ness well below what it otherwise 
wou Id have been without thereby 
increasing in the slightest anyone 
else's happiness, or relieving anyone's 
pain. 
The objection might be made that 
the replacement argument's second 
premise--that the animal would not 
have existed at all were it not for the 
person who brought him into exis­
tence--guarantees that the satisfaction 
of the first premise--that the animal's 
life is on the whole "worth living"--is 
due, at least indi rectly, to the person 
who inflicts the pain and that there­
fore case #1 is excl uded by the 
replacement argument. The bestowal 
of pleasure, in other words, which 
"compensates" the dog for the inflic­
tion of pain, even if provided directly 
by others, is indirectly provided by 
the "owner," insofar as he brought 
the dog into existence and thereby 
made it possible for others to bestow 
benefits on him. 
As ludicrous as this objection 
appears, let us suppose it is justified. 
It would still be perfectly possible for 
someone to inflict pain on an animal 
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without di rectly bestowing any benefit 
whatever upon it himself, so long as 
there were others who were suffi­
cienty concerned to provide such 
benefits, or the animal himself, due to 
otherwise favorable conditions, was 
able to preserve the balance of pleas­
ure over pain in his own life. All 
that the replacement argument 
requires, in other words, for the 
infliction of pain on animals, is satis­
faction, in the weakest possible sense, 
of the criteria cited in case #2. But 
that case, as we have seen, must be 
rejected as immoral if we believe that 
pain is an intrinsic evil, if we are 
utilitarians, or if we· abide by our 
ordinary moral intuitions. 
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So far as the "benefit of existence" 
in concerned, that product of skewed 
logic has al ready been adequately 
refuted by Peter Singer in Animal 
Liberation,S more recent attempts to 
resuscitate it notwithstandi ng. 6 As 
Singer has poi nted out, there is no 
being upon whom the "benefit of exis­
tence" may be conferred. The root of 
the error is a confusion between being 
alive vs. being dead, and existing vs. 
not existing. Aliveness and deadness 
are both forms of existence. When a 
being which was alive dies, it still 
exists, although the form of its exis­
tence has changed. It is a lifeless 
body rather than a live body. . It is 
perfectly reasonable to speak of the 
state of being alive as preferable to 
the state of being dead, since in both 
cases something exists which is the 
"subject" of those states. From the 
vantage point of life, a comparison of 
being alive with being dead can be 
made. No comparison can be made 
between existing and not existing 
since "a being which does not exist" 
(a self-contradictory ph rase) is not in 
any state which can be compared in 
its quality to a state of existence. To 
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not exist is thus neither better nor 
worse than to exist; it lies enti rely 
outside the realm of values, is abso­
Iutely qualityless. Consequently, it 
makes no sense whatsoever to speak 
of benefiting a "non-existent being" 
by bringing "it" into existence. 
Singer, however, has come to 
doubt the truth of h is former position 
on the issue. In Practical Ethics he 
states: "When I wrote Animal Libera­
tion I accepted Salt's view. I thought 
that it was absu rd to tal k as if one 
conferred a favou r on a bei ng by 
bringing it into existence, since at 
the time one confers this favor, there 
is no being at ali. But now I am less 
confident. . After all . . . we do seem 
to do something bad if we knowingly 
bring a miserable being into exis­
tence, and if this is so, it is difficult 
to explain why we do not do some­
thing good when we knowingly bring a 
happy being into existence. "7 
This is one of the "assymetrical 
relations" which has led Singer and 
others into doubting his former posi­
tion. The other is: "If you harm a 
being by ending its life, why do you 
not benefit it by beginning its life?" 
Puzzlement over this second relation is 
more easily I'esolved than over the 
fi rst. The reason it is possible to 
harm a being by ending its life is, 
first, because there is a being which 
has life and can be harmed, and sec­
ond, because as living beings with 
experience of dead beings, we are in 
a position to judge the value of the 
sate of aliveness as compared with the 
state of deadness. Since all the evi­
dence indicates that it is usually bet­
ter to be alive than dead, we are 
accustomed to believing that ending a 
being's life harms him. In the case of 
"non-existent beings," neither of 
these is the case. There is no being 
who can be benefited by bringing "it" 
into existence, and there is no basis 
of comparison, as already noted, 
between non-existence and a state of 
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existence. 
The second "assymetrical relation" 
is more complex. The answer to the 
question, "Why is it not morally good 
to bring a being into the world which 
will be happy?" is quite simply that 
prima facie, it is good to bring such a 
being into the world (leaving aside 
such relevant considerations as: how 
one can be certain the being will be 
happy, how this might negatively 
affect the happiness of others al ready 
in the world, the overpopu lation 
problem, world hunger, etc.). This 
is not equivalent, however, to saying 
that one benefits a "non-existent 
being" by bringing "it" into the 
world. 
It is morally good to bring a being 
into· the world which will be happy 
because this act provides the possibil­
ity for the benefit of happiness to be 
bestowed upon the being, but it is 
not itself a benefit bestowed upon the 
being, since there is as yet no being 
upon which to bestow It. 
On. the other hand, it is morally 
bad to bring a being into the world 
which will be miserable because this 
act provides the possibility for harm 
to be inflicted upon the being, but, 
similarly, it is not itself a harm 
inflicted upon the being, since there 
is as yet no being upon which to 
inflict it. 
The parallel thus proves that while 
bringing a being into the world may 
be a good or bad act depending on 
whether the being will be happy or 
miserable, it does not itself either 
benefit or harm the being, but only 
provides the possibility for benefiting 
or harming the being. Thus the ben­
efit of existence premise adds nothing 
to the replacement argument to justify 
the infliction of pain or death so far 
as the animal is concerned. 8 It does 
not offset, nor can it be weighed 
against the animal's pain or death, 
since non-existence cannot be meas­
ured against a happy existence, nor, 
for that matter, against a miserable 
one. 9 It is neither better nor worse 
to have existed than to have not 
existed, for existence, in itself, is 
neither good nor bad. 1 D 
According to the replacement argu­
ment,it would not be justified to kill 
a deer born in the wild, even if the 
deer could be replaced by one bred 
for that purpose and its life on bal­
ance was "worth living." Yet how 
does this case differ from that of a 
factory farm pig? What has one given 
the pig which one has not given the 
deer? The answer, obviously, is "its 
life." But as we have seen, existence 
in itself is neither good nor bad. It 
depends on how the animal is treated 
after . it is brought into existence. 
Giving it its life may even be morally 
wrong if one intends to ill treat it, 
for one thereby provides the opportu­
nity for that ill-treatment. Hence 
giving the pig life is in no sense to 
bestow a benefit upon it. Conse­
quently, if one treated the pig and 
deer equally well, there would be no 
more justification, in terms of the ani­
mals themselves; 11 for killing the pig 
than for killing the deer. 
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What of the second claim that the 
replacement argument purports to 
prove, namely, that given the condi­
tions cited above, the infliction of 
death upon an animal is justified? It 
is obvious that the replacement argu-:­
ment assumes that the lives of non­
human animals have no intrinsic value 
apart from the animals' capacity to 
experience pleasure and pain. In this 
it is consistent with classical uitlitari­
anism, which reduces good and evil to 
pleasure and pain. The assumption 
that pain is the only moral issue at 
stake in the killing of an animal is 
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grossly counter-intuitive, although a 
utilitarian would try to show, of 
course, that all forms of intrinsic 
value which might be attributed to 
animals' lives are reducible to forms of 
pleasure. 
The replacement argument as 
stated, however, quite clearly fails to 
justify the infliction of death on non­
human animals, just as it fails to jus­
tify the infliction of pain. In this 
regard, too, it is inconsistent with 
the assumption that pain is an intrin­
sic evil, with classical utilitarianism, 
and with our ordinary moral intui­
tions. 
In the fi rst place, so. fa r as the 
animal itself is concerned, it fails to 
exclude the unjustified infliction of 
pain in the process of killing. Infiic­
tion of pa infu I death, with no good 
whatsoever resulting for anyone else, 
is perfectly compatible with the 
replacement a rgument, provided that 
the pain involved is not so great as to 
make the animal's life asa whole more 
painful than pleasurable. 
One must also take into account the 
pain of those who may be affected by 
the animal's death. The most obvious 
way in which an animal's death could 
cause pain to others in the world, 
whether human or non-human, is 
th rough thei r sense of loss or mou rn­
ing for that animal. It is ludicrous to 
suppose that this pain can be elimi­
nated by simply replacing the animal 
with another. Even if one kills the 
animal painlessly, that killing is 
unjustified if it results in pain to 
another unless it also results in the 
relief of greater suffering for that 
being. The replacement argument, 
however, quite clearly permits inflic­
tion of incidental pain on someone else 
as a result of the killing of an animal 
without rei ief of greater s ufferi ng. 
The pain of those affected by the 
animal's death directly is not what 
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proponents of the replacement argu­
ment are chiefly concerned with, how­
ever. They speak instead of a 
reduction in the "total level of happi­
ness" in the world. To kill a happy 
being is· to reduce this level and 
thereby indi rectly the happiness level 
of those who remain in the world. 
The presumption is that the more 
happiness there is in the world, in a 
quantitative sense, the happier are 
the individuals who inhabit it. The 
dubiousness of this assumption has 
already been pointed out above. 12 
The concept of the "total level . of. 
happiness" would seem to be a largely 
mean ingless abstraction. This, how­
ever, is the apparent reason for the 
introduction of the thi rd condition for 
inflicting pain and death on animals, 
namely, that it be replaced after its 
death by another happy animal. 
This premise, together with the 
"benefit of existence" premise, guar-· 
antees that the world's stock of hap­
piness will not be reduced by the 
killing of the animal. For the animal 
being killed was deliberately added to 
the world in the first place by the 
person killing it, and another such 
animal will be added to the world to 
replace it when it is gone. 
It is obvious, however, that pre­
serving the same level of total happi­
ness in the world in no way justifies 
the pain inflicted on the world 
through the killing of animals bred· for 
that purpose. That pain is in no wise 
an unavoidable means to the relief of 
greater suffering of the animals them­
selves or of human beings whose suf­
fering is caused by those animals. 
The replacement argument thus 
permits killing of animals . which 
involves infliction of unjustified pain: 
to the animals themselves, to others 
who care about them, and to "the 
world." Even without raising the 
question as to whether there are not 
other moral issues than pain involved 
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in the killing of animals, it is obvious 
that the replacement argument fails to 
justify such killing. 
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Assuming we grant that pain is an 
intrinsic evil, our analysis has shown 
that the replacement argument as 
given· is insufficient to justify the 
infliction of pain and death on non­
human animals. I have also tried to 
demonstrate that it is inconsistent 
with classical utilitarianism, from 
which it derives, and that if con sis­
tently followed, involves consequences 
which few of us would be willing to 
accept. 
Can the replacement argument be 
modified in such a way as to square 
with the assumption that pain is an 
intrinsic evil, with utilitarianism, and 
with ou r ordi na ry moral intu itions, 
while still allowing us to use and kill 
animals for human benefit? Let us 
recall our conclusions regarding the 
cases in which the deliberate infliction 
of pain is morally justified. It is jus­
tified, we said, to inflict lesser pain 
on a being which is threatening us or 
someone else with greater pain, pro­
vided that this is the only way to 
prevent the greater pain. Secondly, 
it is justified to inflict lesser pain on 
a being if it is the only means of pre­
venting. greater pain in the being 
himself. 13 
It should be obvious that these 
criteria effectively eliminate as immoral 
all use of animals for human benefit 
which involves any infliction of pain 
whatsoever. Some uses of animals 
. might still be morally permitted, for 
example, the keeping of free roving 
chickens for eggs, and the use of 
certain animals for farming or other 
labor, where the animal is not over­
worked, and is provided with all nec­
essary care, a natural environment, 
and the means of satisfying his social, 
psychological, and physical needs. 
Study of animals in simulated natural 
envi ronments and even a limited range 
of non-painful, non-stressful experi­
ments might also be permitted by 
these principles. Consumption of the 
bodies of animals which have died a 
natural death would also involve no 
violation of these criteria. 14 Quite 
clea rly, however, the vast majority of 
our uses of live animals for supposed 
human benefit would have to be elimi­
nated if my reasoning is correct and 
we are at all concerned to act morally. 
Such a fundamental change in our 
life-style would ideally be a major step 
toward the ultimate goal of ceasing 
altogether, insofar as possible, to 
interfere in the lives of other animals. 
What about killing? Since it is 
extremely dubious whether painless 
killing is possible (or at least practi­
cable), this requirement alone might 
prohibit all killing of animals for 
human benefit. 
Let us assume, however, that 
painless killing is possible. Can the 
replacement argument be revised in 
such a way as to ci rcumvent the 
problem of the incidental pain caused 
to others and to "the world" by the 
killing of the animal? So far as the 
first point is concerned, the sugges­
tion might be made that the animal 
could be raised in isolation both from 
humans and from his own kind, so as 
to avoid the problem of pain caused to 
others. In the case of many animals, 
however, this solution would betray· 
the criteria in a different way. For 
any animals which have social instincts 
(and how many of them don't?) would 
surely suffer psychological pain under 
such circumstances, pain which would 
not be justified by relief from greater 
suffering for the animals themselves. 
Two other possible solutions, how­
ever, come to mind, neither of which 
would appear to be beyond the 
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ingenuity of those who are determined 
to use animals for human benefit. 
One might breed the animal selectively 
in such a way as to eliminate the 
social instinct or to cause brain dam­
age sufficient to make the animal obli­
vious to his normal social needs. To 
be· sure, this has not yet been done, 
but there is no reason to presume it 
is beyond the reach of scien·ce. Or 
one might allow the animal social con­
tact with his own kind (while conceal­
ing its existence from humans), but 
kill them all at slaughter time. 
Short of these solutions, any kill­
ing of an animal which caused inci­
dental suffering to others could only 
be justified if it was the only means 
to the relief of their greater suffer­
ing. 
What about the pain inflicted on 
the world? To begin with, this notion 
is arguably incoherent. It seems 
clear that "the world" cannot mean­
ingfully be regarded as a super-indi­
vidual, and that the total level of 
happiness in the world is· no gauge of 
the average level of. happiness of the 
individuals in the world. Moreover, it 
seemS patently absurd to maintain that 
a reduction in this total level of hap­
piness in. the world will have an 
impact on the happiness of all the 
individuals in the world. How could 
the loss of happiness inflicted on the 
world through the removal of a single 
animal possibly filter down to. all the 
other individuals? 
It follows from this that the pain 
inflicted on the world through the 
killing of animals is, at most, pain 
inflicted on some individuals who are 
in a position to be negatively affected 
in one way or another by that killing. 
But it is difficu It to see who these 
individuals could be unless they are 
the very beings already discussed, 
who suffer loss from the killing of the 
animal. Thus the same conclusions 
would apply. 
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If we presume that animals can be 
killed painlessly, then it is theoreti­
cally possible to modify the replace­
ment argument in such a way as to 
square with the principle that pain is 
an intrinsic evil. The modifications 
necessary, however, would virtualy 
eliminate, or render impracticable, the 
ach ievement of its original pu rpose, 
namely, to justify the continued use 
of animals for human benefit. 
Moreover, the replacement argu­
ment would still rest upon other 
assumptions which are extremely 
questionable: that animals' lives are 
intrinsically worthless apart from their 
capacity to experience pleasu re and 
pain, and that the prevention of an 
animal's future pleasure is not morally 
wrong. 
All that is necessary to recognize 
the questionableness of these assump­
tions is to apply the test of our ordi­
nary moral intuitions to the revised 
version. Would we be willing to con­
sistently apply this argument to 
human beings? We may presume that 
human lives are generally of greater 
value than non-human lives and that 
for them pain is not the only consid­
eration. It is equally obvious, how­
ever, that not all human lives· are of 
greater value than ali animal lives. 
Would we be willing, then, to 
acknowledge the moral· legitimacy of 
breeding mentally retarded humans for 
human use so long as they were 
spared suffering, killed painlessly, 
and replaced by other defective 
humans? If not, then I would draw 
the conclusion to which this whole 
enquiry has been tending, namely, 
that while animals' lives unquestion­
ably differ significantly in value, and 
no doubt are generally inferior in 
value to human lives, each and every 
116 E&A II 1/4 
one is unique. No animal is "replace­-
able. " 
George P. Cave 
Trans-Species Unlimited 
NOTES 
1 Cf. Peter Singer, Animal Libera­-
tion, Avon Books, N.Y., 1975, 
pp.1-24. 
2 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 
Cambridge University Press, N.Y. , 
1979, pp. 100 ff. 
3 Cf. Ibid and Ethics & Animals, V. 
2, No.3, pp. 46ff. 
4 To maintain consistency, classical 
utilitarianism has to admit, in theory, 
the moral legitimacy of inter-species 
comparisons of utility and the possi­-
bility of inflicting lesser pain on 
humans in order to relieve greater 
pain in non-humans. Traditionally, 
however, utilitarians have tried to 
circumvent these conclusions by 
appealing to other considerations rele­-
vant to the determination of the total 
quantity of pain involved, e.g., the 
painful. effect on a person's friends 
and relatives etc. That utilitarians 
have felt compelled to resort to all 
sorts of clever means of forestalling 
the conclusions which follow from their 
own reasoning confirms the fact that 
the principle in question violates our 
moral intuitions, at least once we rec­-
ognize its full implications. 
s Animal Liberation, p. 241. 
6 Ethics & Animals, op. cit., pp. 53 
ff. 
7 Practical Ethics, p. 100. 
8 It is, however, relevant to the 
question of the "total level of happi­-
ness in the world." See below, p. 
113. 
9 Even if the conferral of existence 
were a benefit, however, it is obvious 
that this benefit does not result from 
the infliction of pain or death and 
consequently can in no way justify it. 
lOam not contradicti ng here my 
former claim that it is possible to 
compare being alive with being dead. 
The quality of the state of being alive 
usually makes it better .than the state 
of being dead. Mere existence, how­-
ever, no matter what state of exis­-
tence one is speaking of, is not in 
itself good or bad. 
11 See below, p. 113. 
12 See above, p. 107. 
13 With human beings, however, it 
would also be morally required to 
obtain their consent. The impossibil­-
ity of doing so in the case of non-hu­-
man animals makes ou r responsibilty 
for being absolutely certain. that we 
are acting in their own best interest 
in inflicting pain on them all the more 
grave. 
14 This is not to condone any of these 
practices, but merely to point out that 
they are not inconsistent with the 
assumption upon which the present 
argument is based, namely, that pain 
is an intrinsic evil. In my· view ani­-
mals' rights are by no means limited 
to freedom from unnecessary pain and 
death, but include, at least to some 
degree, freedom of movement, satis­-
faction of behavioral needs, freedom 
from genetic manipulation, and 
respectfu I treatment of thei r bodies. 
